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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of capacity constraints on the sustainability
of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand fluctuations. In the absence
of capacity constraints (i.e. a limiting case of our model), Haltiwanger and
Harrington (1991) show that firms find it more difficult to collude during periods
of decreasing demand. We find that this prediction can be overturned if firms’
capacities are sufficiently small. Capacity constraints imply that punishment
profits move procyclically, so that periods of increasing demand may lead to
lower losses from cheating even if collusive profits are rising. Haltiwanger and
Harrington’s main prediction remains valid for sufficiently large capacities.
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1 Introduction
The ability of firms to collude over the business cycle has been a major topic of research
in theoretical and empirical industrial organization over the last two decades. The
literature has commonly used an infinitely repeated game where firms try to sustain
the highest level of profits with credible threats to punish defectors. As firms have a
short-run temptation to cheat from the collusive agreement, collusion is stable only if
the one-shot deviation gains do not exceed the losses of future collusive profits, net of
the value of punishment profits. Changes in demand conditions affect both the gains
and losses from cheating, implying that the balance between the two need not remain
constant as demand moves over time. Therefore, the state of the business cycle has a
crucial effect on the sustainability and profitability of collusive outcomes.
In this paper, we revisit the classical question of whether firms find it more difficult
to collude during booms or during recessions. Our point of departure is the model
developed by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) (hereafter, HH). Holding constant
the level of current demand, they show that firms’ incentives to deviate are strength-
ened when future demand is falling, given that the value of the forgone collusive profits
is smaller as compared to when demand is rising. Therefore, it is more difficult to
sustain collusion during periods of decreasing demand. This result crucially depends
on marginal costs being constant in output and symmetric across firms, as this means
that punishment profits are zero and therefore invariant to demand movements. If a
weakening of demand conditions also leads to a drop in punishment profits, it is no
longer clear whether firms would lose less by deviating in periods of falling demand.
What this implies for our current purposes is that the effects of future demand move-
ments on the sustainability of collusion are not unambiguous, as they are under the
assumption of constant (and symmetric) marginal costs.1
By introducing capacity constraints into HH’s formulation, we show that the issue of
whether firms find it more difficult to collude during booms or recessions is unambigu-
1Typically, most of the industries which have been subject to empirical analyses of collusive behav-
ior are characterized either by cyclical cost movements (as the gasoline market analyzed by Borenstein
and Shepard (1996) ), or by tight capacity constraints (as the aluminum industry analyzed by ? and
Bresnahan and Suslow (1989) , or the cement industry analyzed by Iwand and Rosenbaum (1991) and
Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) , among others).
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ously linked to the value of firms’ capacities. When capacity constraints are sufficiently
tight, firms find it more difficult to collude during booms, whereas the contrary is true
for larger capacity values. Intuitively, when capacity constraints are severe enough, the
lack of excess capacity during a boom implies that the future costs of being punished
are low. Thus, the losses from cheating decrease even if collusive profits are rising. In
contrast, the emergence of excess capacity during a recession makes the punishment
threat more severe, and thereby induces an increase in the losses from cheating even if
collusive profits decline.
1.1 Review of related papers
This paper also contributes to highlight the importance of the assumptions made in
some of the previous papers on collusion. For our current purposes, two assumptions are
crucial: first, whether firms are capacity constrained (or more generally, whether pro-
duction costs exhibit some degree of decreasing returns to scale); and second, whether
there is some link between current and future demand conditions. The literature on
collusion is vast, so we will just review here the papers that are most related to our
work.
In a seminal paper, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) explore optimal collusive pric-
ing assuming that demand is subject to (observable) independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) shocks and that firms’ marginal costs are constant in output. Under
these assumptions, the current level of demand only affects the sustainability of col-
lusion through its positive effect on firms’ short-run temptation to cheat: deviations
are more profitable in periods of high demand given that undercutting allows the de-
viator to capture a larger share of the market. However, the level of current demand
has no effect on firms’ expectations of future demand, and thus the expected losses
from cheating are independent of the level of current demand. Associating a boom
(recession) with a period of high (low) demand, Rotemberg and Saloner find that it is
more difficult to sustain collusion during booms, when the incentive to deviate is the
greatest.2
2Given the i.i.d. assumption, expected future demand at a period with a high demand realization
is lower than current demand. Therefore, in Rotemberg and Saloner’s model, a boom (current demand
is high) is also a period in which future demand is falling. This should be noted to avoid confusion
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By introducing capacity constraints into Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)’s model,
Staiger and Wolak (1992) show that the price wars during booms relationship can be
reversed. The main reason is that capacity constraints, by limiting the size of the
market that a firm can capture by itself, reduce the profitability of defections when
demand is sufficiently high. However, by retaining the assumption that the shocks
in demand are i.i.d., Staiger and Wolak omit an equally important factor: namely,
that the existence of capacity constraints also alters the value of the future losses
from cheating through their impact on the severity of future punishments. ? and
Compte and Rey (2002) highlight the importance of capacity constraints in shaping
punishment possibilities. However, since these models assume fixed demand over time,
they cannot be used to address the issue of whether booms or recessions are critical
for the sustainability of collusion.
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) replace the i.i.d. assumption by assuming in-
stead that demand is subject to (deterministic) cyclical demand fluctuations.3 This
approach is better suited to understand the influence of the business cycle on firms’
pricing behavior since “stronger (weaker) demand tomorrow” is exactly what firms ex-
pect if they believe that the economy is in an upturn (downturn). Hence, even if, in
the absence of capacity constraints, it is still true that the greatest deviation gains are
achieved at the peak of the cycle, it is no longer clear whether collusion will be weaker
during booms if the greater incentives to deviate are offset by the increasing value of
the forgone collusive profits.
Given that our paper is closely related to HH’s, it is worthwhile understanding its
main insights through the following thought experiment. Consider two points on the
cycle with equal demand, but such that demand is increasing in one and decreasing in
the other. Clearly, the losses from cheating are greater at the point at which demand is
rising, since the near-term profits, which are more heavily weighted, are expected to be
with our (and HH’s) terminology, according to which a boom is a period followed by larger demand
levels.
3Kandori (1991) assumes correlated demand shocks. More recently, Bagwell and Staiger (1997)
assume that the level of market demand alternates stochastically between states of slow (recessions)
and fast (boom) growth rates. They show that collusive pricing is weakly procyclical or countercyclical
depending on whether market demand growth rates are positively or negatively correlated through
time.
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higher. Thus, the high cost that would be induced by a price war acts as a deterrent to
firms’ incentives to cheat. Since such a deterrent is weaker when demand is expected
to fall, collusion is more vulnerable during recessions than during booms. However, as
already mentioned, the constant marginal cost assumption hides the possibility that
future demand movements may also affect future punishment profits, and thus provides
an incomplete picture of collusion possibilities in industries where this assumption is
not satisfied.
Our model relaxes both the assumption that demand shocks are i.i.d. and the
assumption that marginal costs are constant in output. By allowing demand to move
in cycles (as opposed to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Staiger and Wolak (1992)),
we can shed some light on the link between the state of the business cycle and the
sustainability of collusion. Furthermore, by introducing capacity constraints, we can
provide an answer to the question of whether firms find it more difficult to collude in
booms or in recessions for all capacity values, and not only for the limiting case in
which capacities tend to infinity (which is equivalent to the assumption of capacity-
unconstrained firms, as in HH). By capturing these two elements at a time, our model
is able to highlight new results that, although previously conjectured by some authors,
have not been so far formalized.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 provides the analysis and main results, and Section 4 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an industry with n infinitely lived firms, where n ≥ 2 and finite, which
compete in every period t ≥ 1 by making simultaneous pricing decisions. Firms are
symmetric as they offer homogenous products, and face identical cost functions with
constant marginal costs (normalized to zero) up to their (exogenously given) symmetric
capacity, k. Production above capacity is impossible, i.e. infinitely costly. Market
demand in period t is represented by the demand function D(p, θt), where p denotes
4See, for instance, Borenstein and Shepard (1996),Cowling (1983), Iwand and Rosenbaum (1991),
and Rosenbaum (1989).
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price and θt is a demand parameter. Furthermore, we make the following standard
assumptions about demand:
A 1 : D (·, θt) is a continuous and bounded function, ∀t;
A 2 : There exists a price p (θt) > 0 such that D(p, θt) = 0 if and only if p ≥ p (θt) , ∀t;
A 3 : D (·, θt) is decreasing in p, ∀p ∈ [0, p (θt)] , ∀t;
A 4 : pD (p, θt) is strictly quasi-concave in p, ∀p ∈ [0, p (θt)] , ∀t;
A 5 : The parameter θt defines a family of demand functions such that θt′ > θt′′ implies
p (θt′) ≥ p (θt′′) and D (p, θt′) > D (p, θt′′) for all p < p (θt′) .
We must specify how customers are rationed when the firms offering the lowest
prices have insufficient capacity to serve all demand. We follow the specification used
by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986), among others, and
assume that demand is rationed according to the efficient rationing rule.5
An implication of A 4 is that, for given θt, there exists a unique monopoly price
pm (θt) that maximizes total industry profits, i.e.
pm (θt) = argmax
p
{pmin [D (p, θt) , nk]} .
Furthermore, whenever D(0, θt) > (n− 1) k, there exists a unique price pr (θt, k) ,
referred to as the ‘residual monopoly price’, that maximizes a firm’s profits from serving
the residual demand when their competitors are selling at capacity, i.e.
pr (θt, k) = argmax
p
{pmin [D (p, θt)− (n− 1) k, k]} .
It will be convenient to write
pim (θt) = p
m (θt)D(p
m (θt) ; θt) (1)
pir (θt, k) = p
r (θt, k) [D(p
r (θt, k) ; θt)− [n− 1] k] (2)
5The efficient rationing rule specifies that consumers buy first from the low-priced firms, until their
capacities are exhausted. The residual demand faced by the high-priced firms equals total demand net
of the capacity of the low-priced firms. Davidson and Deneckere (1986) discuss alternative rationing
rules.
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to denote monopoly profits and the residual monopolist’s profits. From A 5 it follows
that both pm (θt), p
r (θt, k) , and the profit function evaluated at these prices, are in-
creasing in θt. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that both p
r (θt, k) and pi
r (θt, k)
are strictly decreasing in k for all k such that D(0, θt) > (n− 1) k.
To investigate the impact of demand fluctuations on the sustainability of collusion,
we place a similar structure on the intertemporal movement of demand as that of HH.
The demand parameter θt is assumed to fluctuate in cycles of length t according to (3),
θt =

θ1 if t ∈
{
1, t+ 1, 2t+ 1, ...
}
,
...
...
θt̂ if t ∈
{
t̂, t+ t̂, 2t+ t̂, ...
}
,
...
...
θt if t ∈
{
t, 2t, 3t, ...
}
.
(3)
We only impose the restriction that this cycle must be single-peaked. That is,
starting at period 1 of the cycle, the demand function is assumed to shift out over
time, up to some period t̂, and to shift back until it reaches its minimum level at
t = t+ 1. We thus have the following assumption:
A 6 : θ1 < ... < θt̂ > ... > θt > θ1.
An implication of A 6 is that monopoly profits and the residual monopolist’s profits
move in the same direction as market demand. That is, monopoly profits increase from
period 1 to period t̂, and then shift down from period t̂+1 to t+1. Similarly, the residual
monopolist’s profits increase from the first period at which demand at marginal costs
exceeds the aggregate capacity of [n− 1] firms up to period t̂, and then shifts down
from period t̂ + 1 until the last point of the cycle at which demand at marginal costs
exceeds the aggregate capacity of [n− 1] firms. For all other periods, the residual
monopolist’s profits equal zero, and are therefore invariant to demand movements.
Other than A 6, no further restrictions are imposed on the demand cycle. It can
be symmetric or asymmetric both in the length of the recession and boom, or in the
speed at which demand grows during booms or declines during recessions.6
6Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that demand movements are not so strong so as
to induce exit or entry, nor capacity expansions or contractions. Endogenizing market structure and
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Given this demand and cost structure, firms make simultaneous pricing decisions
so as to meet demand. With an infinite horizon, a strategy for firm i is an infinite
sequence of action functions, {Sit}∞t=1 , where Sit ∈ [0, pm (θt)] specifies the price to
be charged by firm i in period t as a function of the prices charged by all firms in all
previous periods.7 The payoff function for firm i is the sum of discounted profits, where
firms’ common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1) . All firms are assumed to be risk neutral,
and hence aim to maximize their expected payoff. All aspects of the game are assumed
to be common knowledge.
3 Analysis and Results
The aim of this paper is to highlight the effect of capacity constraints on the sus-
tainability of perfect collusion over the cycle. Therefore, we will first characterize the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the path of monopoly prices, {pm (θt)}∞t=1 , to
be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated game described
above.
In a general setting that encompasses ours, Lambson (1988) shows that firms can
be driven down to their security levels (the discounted sum of the stream of minmax
profits in every period) through credible punishments. Since more severe punishment
threats would not be credible, the price path of monopoly prices can be supportable by
subgame perfect equilibria if and only if it is supportable by the threat to revert to a
security level penal code. It is easy to see that firm i receives its minmax profits when all
its rivals price at zero and firm i maximizes its profits over the residual demand. Hence,
at period t, the value of the security level penal code is given by
∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−tpir (θτ , k).
To analyze the sustainability of perfect collusion, we consider the following symmet-
ric strategy profile: each firm is called to price at the monopoly price in every period
as long as no firm has deviated in previous periods, and to revert to the punishment
path driving the deviator’s profits to its security level in the period immediately after
capacity levels is out of the scope of the paper. See Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) for a general
equilibrium approach and Staiger and Wolak (1992) and Compte and Rey (2002) for analysis of
collusion with endogenous capacities.
7Note that we are only considering pure-strategy equilibria. The analysis could nevertheless be
extended in a natural way to allow for non-degenerate mixed strategies. See footnote 8.
Collusion with Capacity Constraints 8
the one in which a deviation takes place.8
The path of monopoly prices is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if and only
if the following condition is satisfied,
Lm (t; δ) ≥ Gm(t) ∀t, (4)
where
Lm (t; δ) =
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tLm (τ) (5)
=
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t
[
1
n
pim (θτ )− pir (θτ , k)
]
,
and
Gm(t) = pm (θt)min {D(pm (θt) ; θt), k} − 1
n
pim (θt) . (6)
In words, when a firm deviates from the monopoly price in period t, it gives up the
difference between its share of monopoly profits and the profits that it attains along
the optimal punishment path in all periods following the deviation. Therefore, Lm (τ)
represents the one-shot losses from cheating in period τ ≥ t+ 1, and Lm (t; δ) denotes
the present discounted value of the losses from cheating from period t + 1 onwards.
Since the optimal deviation in period t is to slightly undercut pm (θt) (and this results
in profits pm (θt)min {D(pm (θt) ; θt), k} rather than 1npim (θt)), Gm(t) represents the
one-shot deviation gain in period t.
The incentive compatibility constraint, (4), can be solved in terms of the discount
factor, δ. As is already standard, the path of monopoly prices is subgame perfect if
and only if the discount factor is sufficiently large.
Proposition 1 There exists δ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that the price path {pm (θt)}∞t=1 is support-
able by subgame perfect equilibria if and only if δ ∈
[
δ̂, 1
)
.
8The same results would be obtained if we relied on grim-trigger strategies that involve an infinite
reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium after a deviation takes place. Since for some demand
values, the one-shot Nash equilibrium is in non-degenerate mixed strategies, one should extend the
strategy space to include the set of mixed strategies (cumulative distribution functions over Sit). See,
among others, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Deneckere and Kovenock (1996), p.4.
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Proposition 1 is used to implicitly define the period of the cycle when firms find
it more difficult to sustain perfect collusion. When the discount factor exceeds δ̂, the
incentive compatibility constraint (4) is satisfied with an strict inequality in all periods.
When it equals δ̂, there exists some point of the cycle, which we will denote t∗, at which
the incentive compatibility constraint (4) is satisfied with an strict equality, whereas it
continues to be satisfied with slack at all other points of the cycle. Therefore, as the
discount factor is slightly reduced below δ̂, t∗ is the first period at which the monopoly
price cannot not be sustained. We thus refer to t∗ as the critical point of the cycle.
In order to asses whether t∗ belongs to the boom or to the recession, we first need
to investigate how the value of the one-shot losses and gains from cheating depends on
the level of firms’ capacities.
For this purpose, let us first assess how the one-shot losses from cheating vary as
a function of the demand parameter θt, for a given level of firms’ capacities. Consider
a situation in which demand is so low relative to firms’ capacities that punishment
profits are driven down to zero. In this case, the losses from cheating are just equal
to the value of the forgone monopoly profits, which are clearly increasing in demand.
However, for higher demand values, capacity constraints start to play a role in limiting
the scope for punishing defectors, i.e. in partly offsetting the increase in the losses
from cheating. When demand is high enough, the increase in collusive profits is not
sufficient to completely outweigh the increase in punishment profits, and the losses
from cheating start to decrease as demand conditions strengthen.
Therefore, the comparison of the one-shot losses from cheating across two periods
with lower and higher demand depends on the value of each firm’s capacity. That
is, on whether it is large enough so that the one-shot losses from cheating are always
increasing in demand, or alternatively, on whether it is low enough so that the one-
shot losses from cheating are always decreasing in demand. The following Lemma
characterizes these two critical values.
Lemma 1 There exists kL ≥ kL such that for all t′, t′′ ∈
{
1, ..., t
}
satisfying θt′ ≥ θt′′ ,
(i) Lm (t′) ≥ Lm (t′′) if k ≥ kL; and
(ii) Lm (t′) ≤ Lm (t′′) if k ≤ kL.
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We can perform the same analysis to understand the impact of capacity constraints
on the value of the one-shot deviation gains. Consider first a situation in which demand
is so low relative to each firm’s capacity that a defector would have enough capacity
to serve all demand at the monopoly price. Thus, the larger demand, the stronger the
one-shot deviation gains. For higher demand levels, the deviator would be capacity-
constrained to expand its production up to the monopoly quantity. Since, as a function
of demand, the increase in the deviator’s profits is of lower-order magnitude than the
increase in monopoly profits, the rate of growth of the one-shot deviation gains starts
to slow down. If demand is high enough, the former effect dominates the latter, which
implies that the one-shot deviation gains are decreasing in demand. Therefore, the
comparison of the one-shot deviation gains across periods depends, as before, on the
value of firms’ capacities.
Lemma 2 There exists kG ≥ kG such that for all t′, t′′ ∈
{
1, ..., t
}
satisfying θt′ ≥ θt′′ ,
(i) Gm (t′) ≥ Gm (t′′) if k ≥ kG; and
(ii) Gm (t′) ≤ Gm (t′′) if k ≤ kG.
Building on these insights, we can now assess whether the critical point of the cycle
for perfect collusion belongs to the boom or to the recession, and how this depends on
the value of firms’ capacities.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique k∗ ∈ [min {kL, kG} ,max{kL, kG}] such that the
critical point of the cycle belongs to the boom, i.e. t∗ ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} if and only if
k ≤ k∗, and to the recession, i.e. t∗ ∈ {t̂, ..., t} , otherwise.
Theorem 1 shows that the critical period of the cycle belongs to the boom when
each firm’s capacity is small enough, and to the recession otherwise.
As shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, parts (i), when capacities are large enough, i.e.
k ≥ max{kL, kG} , both the losses from cheating and the one-shot deviation gains are
larger in periods of greater demand. Hence, the same logic as in HH applies. Note that
the result that recessions are critical for collusion still holds even without excluding
the possibility that the defector might be capacity constrained to capture the whole
market or that punishment profits might be increasing in demand.
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On the other hand, just the opposite occurs when capacities are small enough, i.e.
when k ≤ min {kL, kG} . In this case, as shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, parts (ii), the one-
shot losses and gains from cheating are larger in periods of lower demand. Therefore,
for any point at which demand is falling, tR, one can always find a point at which
demand is rising, tB, that yields at least as high a one-shot gain from defection. Now,
the losses from cheating would be greater at tR, since the near term losses, which are
more heavily weighted, exceed those at tB. Therefore, as δ is slightly reduced below δ̂,
the first point at which the monopoly price cannot be sustained belongs to the boom,
and not to the recession.
For the remaining capacity values, a continuity argument implies that there exists
a monotonic relationship between the level of firms’ capacity and the location of the
critical point for perfect collusion, which moves from the boom to the recession as the
value of capacity goes up.
One would hope to say more about the critical point of the cycle. For instance,
whether it is located at periods of higher or lower demand, and how its exact location
depends on the value of firms’ capacities. However, given the general class of cycles and
demand functions considered, it is not possible to find the exact relationship between
current demand, firms’ capacities and the location of the critical point of the cycle for
firms to perfectly collude. It is possible to find reasonable demand specifications for
which the critical point for collusion lays at the peak of the boom, at the last period of
the cycle, or at any point between these two, if capacities are large enough; or at the
trough of the cycle, at the period just before the peak, or at any point between these
two, for low enough capacities. The following section presents numerical solutions that
provide some examples of these possibilities.
4 Numerical Solutions
We have parameterized the model described above and computed its numerical so-
lutions. We have considered two linear demand functions: under demand function
1 demand shifts are additive, whereas under demand function 2 demand shifts are
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multiplicative. Specifically,
Demand function 1: D1(p, θt) = θt − p
Demand function 2: D2(p, θt) = θt [1− p]
We have further assumed that the demand parameter θt takes eight values over
the cycle, the peak occurring at period t = 5, periods t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} belonging to
the boom and periods t ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8} belonging to the recession. We have considered
three different patterns of demand: demand pattern A is symmetric, demand pattern
B involves a slower rate of decline during the recession, and demand pattern C involves
a slower rate of growth during the boom. Specifically,
Demand pattern A: θt = {160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 190, 180, 170}
Demand pattern B: θt = {160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 195, 190, 185}
Demand pattern C: θt = {160, 165, 170, 175, 200, 190, 180, 170}
We have considered variations of k to compute, for each capacity level, the critical
period for perfect collusion t∗, and the critical discount factor for perfect collusion δ̂(t∗).
The results, for each demand function and demand pattern, are depicted in Figures 1
to 6.
This exercise also helps to identify, for each case, the critical value k∗ above (below)
which t∗ belongs to the recession (boom),9 the value of the critical discount factor for
perfect collusion when k = k∗, δ̂ (k∗) , the minimum discount factor, min δ̂ (k) , and the
value of capacity for which the critical discount factor is minimum. The results, for
each demand function and demand pattern, are summarized in Table 1.
The results illustrate our theoretical findings. Namely, there exists an unambiguous
relationship between capacity levels and the issue of whether the critical point belongs
to the boom (small capacities), or to the recession (large capacities). Furthermore,
these results show, as stated in the text, that it is not possible to provide a general
result concerning the issue of whether the critical point is located at periods of higher
or lower demand, or how its exact location depends on the value of firms’ capacities.
Also, as shown in Brock and Scheinkman (1985), these figures depict a non-monotonic
relationship between the critical discount factor and the value of firms’ capacities,
whose value first decreases as capacity grows (when the boom is critical), and then
9This value is also plotted in the figures as a vertical line.
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Demand Pattern-Function
[
δ̂ (k∗) , k∗
] [
min δ̂ (k) , k
]
A− 1 [0.5776; 45.0] [0.5776; 45.0]
A− 2 [0.6272; 57.0] [0.5988; 45.6]
B − 1 [0.5787; 45.2] [0.5787; 45.2]
B − 2 [0.7251; 81.2] [0.5988; 46.1]
C − 1 [0.5786; 44.9] [0.5786; 44.9]
C − 2 [0.7007; 71.0] [0.5923; 46.2]
Table 1: Critical capacity values and discount factors
increases up to the point in which capacities play no role in limiting the defector’s
profits.
From the inspection of the numerical solutions, there are some recurrent features
that seem to suggest more general results. First, unless capacities are extremely low,
the critical discount factor for perfect collusion is larger when the recession is critical
than when the boom is critical. Second, when the critical point belongs to the recession,
increases in capacities monotonically lead to increases in the discount factor. Third,
when the demand parameter enters the demand function additively, the minimum dis-
count factor that allows for perfect collusion is always attained at the critical capacity
value k∗. And last, the critical point moves down the recession as capacity constraints
become more severe, and never up. However, we have not been able to prove these
results analytically. Further work should evaluate the theoretical plausibility of these
observations.
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Figure 1: The critical point, t∗, and critical discount factor for perfect collusion, δ∗, as
a function of k, Demand Function 1, Demand Pattern A
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Figure 2: The critical point, t∗, and critical discount factor for perfect collusion, δ̂(t∗),
as a function of k, Demand Function 2, Demand Pattern A
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Figure 3: The critical point, t∗, and critical discount factor for perfect collusion, δ̂(t∗),
as a function of k, Demand Function 1, Demand Pattern B
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Figure 4: The critical point, t∗, and critical discount factor for perfect collusion, δ̂(t∗),
as a function of k, Demand Function 2, Demand Pattern B
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Figure 5: The critical point, t∗, and critical discount factor for perfect collusion, δ̂(t∗),
as a function of k, Demand Function 1, Demand Pattern C
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Figure 6: The critical point, t∗, and critical discount factor for perfect collusion, δ̂(t∗),
as a function of k, Demand Function 2, Demand Pattern C
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5 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to identify whether firms find it more difficult
to collude during booms or during recessions, and to assess how this depends on the level
of firms’ capacities. In a model that extends that of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991)
by introducing capacity constraints, we have shown that there exists an unambiguous
relationship between the level of firms’ capacities and the location of the period where
firms find it more difficult to perfectly collude. This point moves from the recession to
the boom as capacity constraints become more severe. The reason underlying this result
goes as follows: when firms face severe capacity constraints, the impact of demand
fluctuations on the value of future punishment profits is greater than its effect on the
value of the forgone collusive profits; hence, periods of expanding demand give rise to
lower losses from cheating, which make collusion more difficult during booms rather
than recessions. When capacity constraints are not severe enough, the increase in the
value of future punishment profits during a boom is not sufficient to outweigh the faster
increase in firms’ collusive profits. Thus, firms find it more difficult to collude during
recessions even if capacity constraints play a role in reducing the one-shot deviation
gains and the severity of optimal punishments.
The main implication of this analysis for the empirical work is that the signs of the
effects of future demand on current prices are not unambiguous. This suggests that
the projected link between the level of future demand and the value of firms’ capacities
could be used as an additional determinant of the intertemporal price path in collusive
industries subject to cyclical demand fluctuations.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
The subgame perfect equilibrium conditions (as expressed in (4)) take the following
form:
Lm (t; δ) =
1
1− δt
[
δLm (t+ 1) + ...+ δt−tLm
(
t
)
+ ...+ δtLm (t)
]
≥ Gm (t) .
First notice that Lm (t; 0) = 0 < Gm (t) , limδ→1 Lm (t; δ) =∞ > Gm (t) and ∂Lm(t;δ)∂δ >
0 = ∂G
m(t)
∂δ
. By the continuity of Lm (t; δ) in δ, there exists δ̂ (t) ∈ (0, 1) such that
Lm (t, δ) ≥ Gm (t) if and only if δ ≥ δ̂ (t) . Hence, the price path of monopoly prices
is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome iff δ ≥ δ̂ = max
{
δ̂ (1) , .., δ̂
(
t
)}
. Since
δ̂ (t) ∈ (0, 1) ∀t, then δ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 1:
The difference between the one-shot losses from cheating in periods t′ and t′′, such
that θt′ ≥ θt′′ , is given by
Lm(t′)− Lm(t′′) = 1
n
[pim (θt′)− pim (θt′′)]− [pir (θt′ , k)− pir (θt′′ , k)] (7)
First note that for k ≥ D(0,θt′ )
n−1 , pi
r (θt′ , k) = pi
r (θt′′ , k) = 0. Given that pi
m (θt′) ≥
pim (θt′′) , it follows that L
m(t′) ≥ Lm(t′′). Second note that for k ≤ D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
,
pim(θt′ )
n
= pir (θt′ , k) , which implies L
m(t′) = 0. Given that Lm(t′′) ≥ 0, it follows that
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Lm(t′) ≤ Lm(t′′). Last, equation (7) is monotonically increasing in k ∈
(
D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
,
D(0,θt′ )
n−1
)
.
To see this, take its total derivative with respect to k,
d [Lm(t′)− Lm(t′′)]
dk
= −
[
dpir (θt′ , k)
dk
− dpi
r (θt′′ , k)
dk
]
Note that
dpir (θt, k)
dk
=
∂pir (θt, k)
∂p
∂pr(θt)
∂k
+
∂pir (θt, k)
∂k
=
∂pir (θt, k)
∂k
∣∣∣∣
p=pr(θt)
= − [n− 1] pr(θt)
where the second equality follows from the envelope theorem, and the third from the
definition of pir (θt, k) , as in (2). Therefore,
d [Lm(t′)− Lm(t′′)]
dk
= − [n− 1] [pr(θt′′)− pr(θt′)] ≥ 0 (8)
By the continuity of Lm(t) in k, it follows that there exists a critical capacity
value k̂L (θt′ , θt′′) ∈
(
D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
,
D(0,θt′ )
n−1
)
such that Lm(t′) ≥ Lm(t′′) if and only
if k ≥ k̂L (θt′ , θt′′). Therefore, Lm(t′) ≤ Lm(t′′) for all t′, t′′ ∈
{
1, ..., t
}
iff k ≥
maxt′,t′′
{
k̂L (θt′ , θt′′)
}
= kL and L
m(t′) ≥ Lm(t′′) for all t′, t′′ ∈ {1, ..., t} iff k ≤
mint′,t′′
{
k̂L (θt′ , θt′′)
}
= kL. Since k̂L (θt′ , θt′′) ∈
(
D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
,
D(0,θt′ )
n−1
)
, then kL, kL ∈(
D(pm(θ1),θ1)
n
,
D(0,θt̂)
n−1
)
Proof of Lemma 2:
The method of proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. The difference between the
one-shot gains from cheating in periods t′ and t′′, such that θt′ ≥ θt′′ , is given by
Gm(t′)−Gm(t′′) = pm (θt′)min {D(pm (θt′) ; θt′), k} − 1
n
pim (θt′) (9)
−
[
pm (θt′′)min {D(pm (θt′′) ; θt′′), k} − 1
n
pim (θt′′)
]
First note that for k ≥ D(pm (θt′) ; θt′),
Gm(t′)−Gm(t′′) = n− 1
n
[pim (θt′)− pim (θt′′)] > 0
Second note that for k ≤ D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
, we have that 1
n
pim (θt′) = p
m (θt′) k, which
impliesGm(t′) = 0.Given thatGm(t′′) > 0 for such a k, it follows thatGm(t′) < Gm(t′′).
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Last, equation (9) is monotonically increasing in k. To see this, take its total derivative
with respect to k,
d [Gm(t′)−Gm(t′′)]
dk
=

0 if k > D(pm (θt′) ; θt′)
pm (θt′) > 0 if D(p
m (θt′′) ; θt′′) ≤ k ≤ D(pm (θt′) ; θt′)
pm (θt′)− pm (θt′′) ≥ 0 if k > D(pm (θt′′) ; θt′′)
By the continuity of Gm(t) in k, it follows that there exists a unique capacity
value k̂G (θt′ , θt′′) ∈
(
D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
, D(pm (θt′) ; θt′)
)
such that Gm(t′) ≥ Gm(t′′) if and
only if k ≥ k̂G (θt′ , θt′′). Therefore, Gm(t′) > Gm(t′′) for all t′, t′′ ∈
{
1, ..., t
}
iff k ≥
maxt′,t′′
{
k̂G (θt′ , θt′′)
}
= kG and G
m(t′) ≤ Gm(t′′) for all t′, t′′ ∈ {1, ..., t} iff k ≤
mint′,t′′
{
k̂G (θt′ , θt′′)
}
= kG. Since k̂G (θt′ , θt′′) ∈
(
D(pm(θt′ ),θt′ )
n
, D(pm (θt′) ; θt′)
)
, then
kG, kG ∈
(
D(pm(θ1),θ1)
n
, D(pm (θt̂) ; θt̂)
)
.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We follow HH’s proof of Theorem 5, and introduce several changes where needed.
Let t∗ be defined by δ̂ = δ̂ (t∗) . To prove Theorem 1, we then need to show that
there exists a unique k∗ ∈ [min {kL, kG} ,max{kL, kG}] such that δ̂ > δ̂ (t) for all
t ∈ {t̂, ..., t} iff k ≤ k∗. Since t∗ exists, then it must lie in {1, ..., t̂− 1} iff k ≤ k∗ and
in
{
t̂, ..., t
}
iff k > k∗.
Define f (t) as follows:
f (t) ≡ max{τ | θτ ≥ θt, τ ∈ {t+ 1, ..., t}} , t ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} .
f (t) is the latest point of the cycle at which the demand parameter is at least as great
as the demand parameter at a period t belonging to the boom. Given that the single
peak of the cycle is attained at t̂, it is clear that f (t) belongs to the recession.
The method of proof will be to show that the difference
[Lm (t; δ)−Gm (t)]− [Lm (f (t) ; δ)−Gm (f (t))] (10)
is negative if k ≤ min {kL, kG}, positive if k ≥ max
{
kL, kG
}
, and that it is monotoni-
cally increasing in k ∈ [min {kL, kG} ,max{kL, kG}] , ∀t ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} . This implies
that there exists a unique k∗ ∈ [min {kL, kG} ,max{kL, kG}] such that (10) is negative
iff k < k∗. Since this implies δ̂ (t) > δ̂ (f (t)) iff k < k∗, this will be sufficient to prove
the Theorem.
These results are stated and proved in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 3
(i) If k ≤ min {kL, kG} , then [Lm (t; δ)−Gm (t)] < [Lm (f (t) ; δ)−Gm (f (t))] ∀t ∈{
1, ..., t̂− 1} .
(ii) If k ≥ max{kL, kG} , then [Lm (t; δ)−Gm (t)] > [Lm (f (t) ; δ)−Gm (f (t))]
∀t ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} .
(iii) The difference [Lm (t; δ)−Gm (t)]− [Lm (f (t) ; δ)−Gm (t)] , is monotonically
increasing in k ∈ [min {kL, kG} ,max{kL, kG}] , ∀t ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} .
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) Let tB ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} and tR = f (tB) . Then,[
Lm
(
tB; δ
)−Gm (tB)] = 1
1− δt
[
δLm
(
tB + 1
)
+ ....+ δtLm
(
tB
)]−Gm (tB)(11)[
Lm
(
tR; δ
)−Gm (tR)] = 1
1− δt
[
δLm
(
tR + 1
)
+ ....+ δtLm
(
tR
)]−Gm (tR)(12)
By the definition of f(t), we know by Lemma 2, that if k ≤ min {kL, kG} , then
Gm
(
tB
)
> Gm
(
tR
)
. Hence, the difference between (11) and (12) is negative if
δLm
(
tB + 1
)
+ ....+ δtLm
(
tB
)
< δLm
(
tR + 1
)
+ ...+ δtLm
(
tR
)
(13)
Define:
A ≡ δLm (tB + 1)+ ...+ δtR−tBLm (tR) (14)
B ≡ δLm (tR + 1)+ ...+ δt−tR+tBLm (tB) (15)
By these definitions, condition (13) is equivalent to
A+ δt
R−tBB < B + δt−t
R+tBA
Rearranging terms,
A
1− δtR−tB <
B
1− δt−tR+tB
(16)
The expression on the left hand side of (16) is the present discounted value of the stream
of the losses from cheating
{
Lm
(
tB + 1
)
, .., Lm
(
tR
)}
made every tR− tB periods, and
the right hand side is the present discounted value of the stream of the losses from cheat-
ing
{
Lm
(
tR + 1
)
, .., Lm
(
tB
)}
made every t− tR + tB periods. Since tR = f (tB) and
k ≤ kL, by Lemma 1 it is then true that Lm (t′) < Lm (t′′) ∀t′ ∈
{
tB + 1, ..., tR
}
, ∀t′′ ∈
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{
tR + 1, ..., tB
}
, which implies that Lm
(
tB, δ
)
< Lm
(
tR, δ
)
. This proves that if k ≤
min
{
kL, kG
}
, then Lm (t; δ)−Gm (t) < Lm (f (t) ; δ)−Gm (f (t)) ∀t ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1}.
(ii) It follows the same lines of the proof of part (i) , with a change in the sign of
the inequalities.
(iii) Again, let tB ∈ {1, ..., t̂− 1} and tR = f (tB) . From the proof of Lemma 2,
dGm
(
tB
)
dk
<
dGm
(
tR
)
dk
Hence, the difference
[
Lm
(
tB; δ
)−Gm (tB)]−[Lm (tR; δ)−Gm (tR)] is monotonically
increasing in k, if
dLm
(
tB; δ
)
dk
>
dLm
(
tR; δ
)
dk
(17)
Using the definitions (14) and (15), condition (17) is equivalent to
dA
dk
>
dB
dk
Since tR = f
(
tB
)
, by the proof of Lemma 1, equation (8), it is then true that
dLm(t′)
dk
> dL
m(t′′)
dk
∀t′ ∈ {tB + 1, ..., tR} ,∀t′′ ∈ {tR + 1, ..., tB} , which implies that condi-
tion (17) is satisfied. This proves that Lm (t; δ)−Gm (t) > Lm (f (t) ; δ)−Gm (f (t)) ∀t ∈{
1, ..., t̂− 1} is monotonically increasing in k, which completes the proof.
